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Abstract
Educational policies are widely recognized as the means par excellence to equalize
opportunities among children with different social and family backgrounds and to
promote intergenerational mobility. In this paper we focus on the French case and
we apply the opportunity equalization criterion proposed by Andreoli, Havnes and
Lefranc (2019) for evaluating the effect of rising compulsory schooling requirements in
secondary education. Our results show that such education expansion has a limited re-
distributive effects on students earnings distribution. Nonetheless, we provide evidence
of opportunity equalization among groups of students defined by family background
circumstances.
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1 Introduction
Equality of opportunity has gained popularity, in scholarly debates as well as among policy-
makers, for defining the relevant objective for distributive justice. Nowadays, public policy
often explicitly seeks to level the playing field among citizens and to equalize opportunities
for a broad range of individual social and economic outcomes (e.g. education, health,
income). In this regard, educational policies are often considered by economists and policy
makers as the means par excellence to equalize opportunities among children with different
social and family backgrounds and to promote intergenerational mobility.
This paper examines whether increasing educational attainment allows equalizing op-
portunities for earnings acquisition. In line with modern theories of social justice, this
paper focuses on inequalities that stem from unfair sources of advantage, such as parental
background, while taking a neutral stance with respect to other factors, such as effort.
Following Roemer (1998) and subsequent literature, we use distributions of earnings con-
ditional on circumstances of origin to measure opportunities, and use gaps in this distri-
bution to assess how unequally opportunities are distributed.1 Our analysis focuses on
the French Berthoin reform, which increased the mandatory schooling age, and assess the
effect of this reform on equality of opportunity using the empirical criteria developed in
Andreoli, Havnes and Lefranc (2019). A policy widens accessibility to the secondary edu-
cation when it provides additional years of schooling to those who would have otherwise
dropped out from the system. If dropout students, who are more likely to benefit from
increasing high school access, are the ones raised in more disadvantaged families, we ex-
pect policies aimed at raising educational attainment to improve the earnings prospects
of students experiencing less advantaged backgrounds, relative to other more advantaged
groups.
A vast body of evidence has been collected about the effect of expanding education at-
tainment on adult earnings. Braga, Checchi and Meschi (2011) provide a detailed account
of the effects of competing reforms affecting duration of education at various stages. A
large part of this literature makes use of reforms affecting the minimum schooling leaving
age as an exogenous source of variation to identify the relevant causal effect of education
on earnings. The implementation time of the reform may serve as an instrument to assess
1Empirical approaches to inequality of opportunity are in Checchi and Peragine (2010), Ferreira and
Gignoux (2011), Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008) and summarized in Ferreira and Peragine (2016).
The approach we pursue is distributional, as in Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2009).
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the direct effect of rising education attainment on the earnings of compliers. Brunello, Fort
and Weber (2009) exploit cohort and country variation in the changes in minimum school
leaving age to identify the effect of education on earnings, assuming homogeneity of the
effect across countries. Nonetheless, the returns associated with an increase in the compul-
sory schooling age are found to be heterogeneous across countries. For example, there are
no evidence of beneficial effects in terms of earnings from reforms implemented in Germany
(Pischke and von Wachter 2008), France (Grenet 2013), the Netherlands (Oosterbeek and
Webbink 2007) and Poland (Liwinski 2020). However, other papers document a positive
effect, between 3 and 7 percent, associated with Swedish (Meghir and Palme 2005) and
British reforms (Devereux and Hart 2010, Grenet 2013, Dolton and Sandi 2017). A posi-
tive effect (6-8 percent) is also found for the German reform by Cygan-Rehm (2018), who
considers in her analysis a different sample and more institutional aspects than Pischke
and von Wachter (2008). Lastly, larger effects ranging from 10 to 15 percent are found in
Canada, US and UK by Oreopoulos (2006, 2007).
Studies of reforms increasing the minimum schooling leaving age have not been re-
stricted to monetary outcomes, but also examine non-monetary dimensions : e.g. risk aver-
sion (Jung 2015), trust (Yang 2019), civic participation (Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos
2004), anti-immigration attitudes (Cavaille and Marshall 2019), and health (Kemptner,
Juerges and Reinhold 2011, Silles 2009, Lager and Torssander 2012, Courtin, Nafilyan, Gly-
mour, Goldberg, Berr, Berkman, Zins and Avendano 2019). Evidence about the intergen-
erational consequence of large educational reforms is limited, and mostly concerns the inter-
generational transmission of human capital (Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2005, Pekkari-
nen, Uusitalo and Kerr 2009), of socioeconomic advantage (Meghir and Palme 2005) and
of health (Meghir, Palme and Simeonova 2018). Evidence on the distributive impact
of education policies on earnings opportunities is also lacking (exceptions are Brunello
et al. 2009, Aakvik, Salvanes and Vaage 2010), albeit own education is the most relevant
mediating channel in the generation of unfair income inequalities (Palomino et al. 2019).
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the opportunity equalizing effect of rising
attendance to secondary education on the group of students who would otherwise drop out
of education too early. To do so, we first estimate the effects of attending additional years
of secondary education on earnings for this selected group. We exploit the context of the
Loi Berthoin as a quasi-natural experimental setting. This reform, enacted in 1959, raised
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minimum school living age from 14 to 16 years for cohorts born in 1953 and after and
can be used as an instrument for educational attainment. We use estimated distributional
effects of rising access to secondary education, heterogeneous both across groups defined
by parental background and across levels of earnings, to simulate the effects of exogenously
rising marginally educational attainment on those born in pre-reform cohorts who dropped
out of education exactly at mandatory age. We use actual data and simulated counter-
factual data to test the global implications of rising education attainment on inequality of
opportunity for earnings acquisition among cohorts born in the 1950s in France.
To assess the impact of this reform, we rely on the opportunity equalization testing
procedure developped by Andreoli et al. (2019). This procedure is robust in the sense
that it draws on social consensus in assessing if the unfair earnings advantage enjoyed
by any given circumstance group with respect to the rest of the distribution in a given
context (for instance, before the Loi Berthoin) shrinks by effect of a given policy change
(for instance, in the simulated distribution of earnings). The test makes use of distribution
gap curves, obtained by differentiating earnings distributions conditional on circumstances
in each policy regime, to test consensus. Applying this testing procedure to actual and
counterfactual earnings distributions in France suggests that raising secondary education
attainment has a weak yet positive impact improving earnings opportunities. We also
find weak evidence of equalization of opportunities across most socioeconomic groups:
individuals from less advantaged family background tend to gain more out of the increase
in minimum school leaving age than those from more advantaged backgrounds. These
results are aligned with the patterns of effects discussed in Meghir and Palme (2005) for
the Swedish education reform and Pekkarinen et al. (2009) for the Finnish reform, but
the equalization potential of rising mandatory schooling seems significantly smaller than
the effect recorded for education expansions taking place as early as kindergarten level
(Andreoli et al. 2019).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the policy frame-
work, defines the simulation procedure and discusses the equalization criterion proposed
by Andreoli et al. (2019). Section 3 presents the data and describe the empirical strategy.
Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Testing the opportunity equalizing effect of educational
expansion
The core objective of this paper is to determine whether raising mandatory schooling
age equalizes the distribution of opportunities between individuals with different circum-
stances, such as family background. In a nutshell, this entails assessing whether the dis-
tributions of individual outcomes, here earnings, come closer together as a result of the
educational expansion.
This assessment requires combining three distinct ingredients. The first ingredient is
an estimation of the causal effect of the reform on the distribution of earnings of treated
individuals. The second ingredient is a simulation of the entire earnings distribution that
results from the reform, reflecting both the effect of the reform on treated individuals
and the distribution of treatment status in the population. The third element is a formal
criterion to judge whether opportunity sets are equalized or not. We now discuss how each
of these ingredients can be developped.
2.1 Estimating the returns to educational expansion
Our first concern is to estimate the causal effect of the educational expansion on the affected
population, i.e. the earnings impact of a rise in mandatory age on the individuals who
would otherwise have dropped sooner. This corresponds to the treatment on the treated
impact and is addressed by resorting to an Instrumental Variables approach. Besides, given
our distributional concern, we need to go beyond the computation of average treatment
effects (Angrist and Krueger 1991, Card 1993) and allow for heterogenous effects. This is
addressed using quantile treatment effect estimates.
To elaborate on our IV approach, let D be an indicator variable capturing the ed-
ucational attainment, where D = 0 corresponds to individuals who drop school at the
(pre-reform) mandatory schooling age and D = 1 indicates individuals with some post-
compulsory education (spending at least one year in the educational system from age 15).
The purpose of the reform is to increase the educational attainment of these individuals
who leave school at the mandatory schooling age from D = 0 to D = 1.
The simple differences in earnings conditional on D does not measure the causal effect
of an increase in educational attainment, since educational outcomes may reflect observable
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and unobservable earnings determinant, notably ability or family background character-
istics. However, educational reforms shifting minimum school living age can be used as
an instrument for education in this context, as used for instance in Harmon and Walker
(1995). In this paper, we exploit the quasi-natural experimental setting induced by the
Berthoin reform (Loi Berthoin) in France as an instrument for educational attainment.
The Berthoin reform passed the French parliament vote in 1959. The reform raised
the mandatory schooling age from 14 to 16 years for all children born after January 1st,
1953.2 Following Grenet (2013) the Berthoin reform can be used to define an instrument
Z for the educational attainment of individuals constrained by the mandatory schooling
age, with Z = 1 if born in or after 1953 and Z = 0 for earlier cohorts. The rationale for
using the reform as an instrument in the estimation of the effect of increased education
on earnings is that the distribution of potential earnings profiles is independent on shift
in education induced by the reform (Card 2001), at least for those cohorts born around
the reform enforcement date. The instrument is independent of the type of unobserved
heterogeneity that we would like to control for: ability, family background effects, “hard”
and“soft”skills and parent investments are likely to be similarly distributed across adjacent
cohorts, while these factors are likely to differ substantially for people self-selecting into
different schooling attainment levels. A second condition for identification is that the IV
has a causal impact on schooling attainment. This is granted by the universal coverage of
the Berthoin reform.
Using this identification strategy, Grenet (2013) estimates the average returns to years
of education, β for early school dropouts, at the discontinuity when the reform is intro-
duced. Estimates of the average returns from education reveal that age left full time
schooling has a small and statistically insignificant impact on earnings, on average. We
move beyond average treatment effects to estimate the distribution of treatment effect
among individuals affected by the reform. We apply the approach developped by Abadie,
Angrist and Imbens (2002) that allows estimating the heterogenous treatment effects β(p)
for any quantile of the earnings distribution. Our estimates are obtain from a sample of
French male employee who have taken at most some years of secondary education without
completing it. Reducing the estimating sample to this group allows to identify the effect
of a marginal change in education within an instrumental variable framework.
2See Grenet (2013) for a detailed description of the reform.
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2.2 Simulating the effect of educational expansion on the earnings dis-
tribution
The next step requires to assess the effect of the educational reform on the distribution of
earnings in the population at large. Our concern is to assert what the earnings would have
been in the pre-reform group, had it been affected by the reform. We let F (y) denote the
earnings distribution and Q(p) denote the associated quantile function.
Comparing the earnings distribution between cohorts unaffected by the reform (F (y|Z =
0) and cohorts affected (F (y|Z = 1)) fails to provide a consistent estimator of the effect
of the reform on the distribution of earnings. In fact only a small fraction of the pop-
ulation is directly impacted by the mandatory school age and its reform across cohorts.
This corresponds to individuals who reported dropping out of school at the mandatory
age (D = 0). At the same time, various shocks might have been at work between the
pre- and post-reform cohorts that would have affected the overall earnings distribution,
independently of the reform effect. Hence, the distribution F (y|Z = 1) does not provide a
relevant counterfactual for what the earnings distribution of group Z = 0 would have been
if this group had experienced the increase in the mandatory schooling age.
To obtain a credible counterfactual distribution, we combine the observed earnings
distribution in the pre-reform with estimates of the quantile treatment effects of the reform
in the following way. We first assume that only individuals who dropped out of school
at the mandatory age would have been affected by the reform. This amounts to rule
out the possibility of spill-over effects. For individuals who left school at the mandatory
age, we assume that their educational attainment increases by the rise in the mandatory
age (i.e. 2 years) and adjust their earnings by the estimated quantile treatment effects,
conditional on their observed quantile. Formally, letting Qˆ denote the counterfactual
quantile function, we assume : Qˆ(p|D = 0, Z = 0) = Q(p|D = 0, Z = 0) + β(p), where
β(p) is estimated following the identification strategy presented in Section 3.2. Inverting
this quantile function provides the counterfactual distribution among the group D = 0,
Fˆ (y|D = 0, Z = 0). The overall counterfactual in the whole population results from the
mixing of the counterfactual distribution in both groups D = 0 and D = 1 and is given by
:
Fˆ (y|Z = 0) = p0Fˆ (y|D = 0, Z = 0) + (1− p0)F (y|D 6= 0, Z = 0), (1)
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with p0 = p(D = 0|Z = 0).
Using the same approach, we can also compute the counterfactual distributions for
subgroups of the population defined by their circumstances c, Fˆ (y|Z = 0, c) that are
required to assess equalization of opportunities, as we now explain.
2.3 Testing equalization of opportunity
Equality of opportunity (EOP) theories draw a distinction between fair inequality, arising
from differences in individual effort, and unfair inequality arising from differences in indi-
vidual circumstances, which comprises the determinants of success for which society deems
the individual not to be responsible. In this setting, equality of opportunity requires that
individuals face similar opportunities for outcome, regardless of their circumstances. This
corresponds to the compensation principle (e.g. Roemer 1998, Fleurbaey 2008).
Following Lefranc et al. (2009) (henceforth LPT) the earnings opportunities offered
to individuals with circumstances c can be characterized by the conditional distribution
function of earnings, given circumstances, F (y|c), where c is a vector of observable circum-
stances. Equality of opportunity is then said to prevail in the distribution of earnings if
for any pair of possible circumstances (c, c′) with c 6= c′ the following condition prevails:
F (y|c) = F (y|c′) for any y.
This condition is very demanding and likely to be violated in many empirical contexts.
However, situations where outcome distributions differ across types, i.e, among individuals
sharing similar circumstance, do not necessarily imply that one type is unambiguously
advantaged over the others. LPT propose to single out cases where such an advantage
unambiguously exists, by resorting to stochastic dominance tools. For instance, when
F (y|c) dominates F (y|c′) by first-order stochastic dominance, the expected utility of the
opportunity set is larger for type c compared to type c′. When the distributions can
be ranked according to second-order stochastic dominance, all risk-averse preferences will
prefer the opportunity set offered to type c compared to type c′. These two situations
obviously correspond to strong deviations from the equality of opportunity principle.
Combining these different notions of equality and inequality of opportunity allows
to characterize a given distribution of outcomes from the point of view of EOP. The
perspective of the present paper departs from this concern, in the sense that instead of
assessing a given situation, from the EOP perspective, we wish to assess the effect of a
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policy reform on the extent of inequality of opportunity. This requires comparing two
distributions : the distribution that prevails before the implementation of the reform and
the counterfactual distribution that incorporates the effect of the reform. Accordingly,
the distributions we want to compare can be indexed by a social state variable pi which
indicates whether a given policy is implemented (pi = 1) or not (pi = 0)3. With these
notations Fpi(y|c) defines the opportunities offered to individuals with type c in social
state pi. Our objective is thus to compare the distribution of these opportunity sets, across
types, between the two social states and to assert whether implementing the reform (i.e
moving from social state pi = 0 to social state pi = 1) equalize opportunity.
Our assessment of equalization of opportunity rests on the criterion developped by
Andreoli et al. (2019) (henceforth AHL). The EZOP equalization criterion of AHL stems
from the notion that opportunities are equalized if the advantage enjoyed by the advantaged
types decrease when society moves from social state pi = 0 to social state pi = 1. To
substantiate this notion, the EZOP criterion makes use of cardinal indices of advantage to
measure the expected welfare of a lottery with cumulative distribution F . The notion of
economic advantage offered by circumstance type c (with distribution F ) relative to type
c′ (with distribution F ′) requires to compare the welfare index across circumstance: if
welfare is larger for type c than for type c′ then the value of the opportunity set is greater
for type c than for type c′. Equalization occurs when there is agreement in a relevant set
of evaluation functions that unfair disadvantage is reduced due to implementation of the
policy.
AHL provide the minimal empirical conditions that need to be imposed on the set of
distributions F0, F
′
0, F1, F
′
1 in order to ensure that equalization is satisfied for all preferences
in the class of Yaari’s (1987) rank-dependent model (denoted R) and within the Von
Neumann expected utility model. More specifically, let Γ(F, F ′, p) = F−1(p) − F ′−1(p)
denote the cumulative distribution gap between F and F ′, then a necessary condition for
EZOP is that the cumulative distribution gap should be smaller, in absolute value, at any
percentile, under pi = 1 than under pi = 0. The graph of Γ(F, F ′, p) against p is referred to
as the Gap curve. As a consequence, if EZOP is satisfied on the set of preferences R then
for all p ∈ [0, 1], we have: |Γ(F1, F ′1, p)| ≤ |Γ(F0, F ′0, p)|.
When there is agreement on the ranking of types, gap curve dominance provides a
3More generally, the two social states may also correspond to two periods or two countries that one
would like to compare (Andreoli and Fusco 2019).
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necessary and sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity. When gap curves cross,
then agreement on the effect of a policy on Inequality of Opportunity (IOP) cannot be
reached. In some cases, types cannot be ranked. AHL derive a condition allowing to
endogenously identify a restricted set of preferences of R over which unanimity might be
reached regarding equalization of opportunity. Unanimity within this class of functions can
be tested by virtue of inverse stochastic dominance analysis (Muliere and Scarsini 1989,
Andreoli 2018). More specifically, let Λkpi(p) (respectively Λ
′k
pi (p)) the integral of order k−1
of the inverse distribution functions of Fpi (respectively F
′
pi) evaluated at fractional rank p,
and let Γ(Λkpi,Λ
′k
pi , p) = Λ
k
pi(p)−Λ′kpi (p), the cumulative distribution gap integrated at order
k−1. Therefore, EZOP will be satisfied in the setRκ only if |Γ(Λκ0 ,Λ′κ0 , p)| ≥ |Γ(Λκ1 ,Λ′κ1 , p)|
for any p ∈ [0, 1]. This condition is also sufficient whenever for all pi the distribution Fpi
dominates distribution F ′pi for order-κ inverse stochastic dominance (Fpi ISDκ F ′pi). If
unambiguous dominance of one type with respect to another cannot be established under
both policy regimes, then gap curve dominance does not allow to conclude. In this context,
lack of gap curve dominance can still be used to conclude against EZOP.
Distributional effects of the policy can also be used to assess opportunity amelioration:
a simple test would require to assess if the distributional effects expand opportunity profiles
and/or reduce earning differences at the extremes of the distribution. That is, circumstance
c, Γ(Λκ1 ,Λ
κ
0 , p) ≥ 0 for every p and for some order κ.
In the rest of the paper, we use the EZOP criterion and identification conditions to
assess whether the educational expansion that resulted from the Berthoin reform allowed
to equalize opportunities between individuals from different parental background. Social
state pi = 0 corresponds to the status quo pre-reform distribution ; social state pi = 1
corresponds to the counterfactual distribution where individuals dropping out of school at
the mandatory age would be treated by the reform. The next sections provide the details
of our estimation and testing procedures and present the results.
3 Data and estimation procedure
3.1 Data
We use data from the French Labor Force Survey (LFS, Enqueˆte Emploi collected by
INSEE) for the years 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. The sample is a
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rotating panel, therefore we select only particular years of the survey to preserve exclusively
the cross sectional information.4 The LFS is a large representative sample of the French
population of age 15 and above. There are on average 15,000 respondents per cohort in our
pooled sample. Our sample is restricted to French male employees with full-time jobs in
the private sector, born between 1950 and 1955, for a total of 26,421 observations, equally
distributed across cohorts.
The LFS database reports, for each individual, information on monthly earnings after
taxes, which we use to measure earnings opportunities. Data also report information on the
socioeconomic status (SES) of the respondent’s father during childhood, measured at the
end of compulsory education, and father’s citizenship. Based on this measures of parental
background, we partition our sample into fours types: Circumstance 1 gathers individuals
whose father is non French, nearly 6% of the overall sample. The remaining population,
with a French father, is split into three groups according to father’s SES: Circumstance 2
if father was a farmer or a manual worker; Circumstance 3 if the father was an artisan or
non-manual worker; Circumstance 4 if the father was executive or professional. Data also
report information on nationality, gender, age when leaving education, years of education
and highest degree obtained, job status (self-employed, employed and in public sector) and
information about family status.
We split observations in two groups defined by their exposure to the Berthoin reform
: those born 1950-1952 (reform exposure indicator variable Z = 0) and those born after
the implementation of the reform in cohorts 1953-1955 (Z = 1). As motivated by Grenet
(2013), the Berthoin reform induced a significant increase of roughly one year in age left full
time schooling for cohorts born after 1953, with respect to older cohorts. This is implied by
the raise in mandatory schooling age from 14 to 16 years. This result is also illustrated in
Table 1, where differences in education and age of leaving school are significantly different
between groups born before and after the Berthoin reform.
The treatment variable takes value D = 1 if spending at least one year of secondary
education beyond mandatory schooling age (i.e. above age 16 (14) for post- (pre-) reform
cohorts) but without completing it. The variable identifies a conservative group of those
4The panel rotation frequency was of three years before 2003 and earnings information are available
only after 1990. This explains the choice of the years 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999. Moreover, the rotation
frequency after 2003 changed to one year and a half (that is, one-sixth of the sample is replaced every
trimester). Picking up information every two years allows to deal with a renewed sample, as in years 2004,
2006, 2008 and 2010. The year 2002 is not exploited due to imperfections in the data collected.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: covariates before and after the reform (Z)
After reform (Z=1) Before reform (Z=0)
(1) (2)
Individual characteristics:
Wage, monthly, in Euro 1,676.578 [2,876.4] 1,737.303 [3,246.8]
Prizes 0.511 [0.5] 0.525 [0.5]
Weekly working hours 40.120 [9.4] 40.338 [9.7]
Self employed 0.022 [0.1] 0.026 [0.2]
Employed in the public sector 0.244 [0.4] 0.251 [0.4]
Education, years 12.116 [3.3] 11.903 [3.6]
Age, in years (above 15) 43.984 [6.5] 46.165 [6.0]
Marriage status 0.758 [0.4] 0.790 [0.4]
Number of children below 18 1.034 [1.1] 0.907 [1.1]
Socioeconomic conditions of the father:
Circumstance 1
Father without french nationality 0.066 [0.2] 0.060 [0.2]
Circumstance 2 0.539 [0.5] 0.533 [0.5]
Farmers 0.113 [0.3] 0.119 [0.3]
Manual worker 0.456 [0.5] 0.443 [0.5]
Circumstance 3 0.220 [0.4] 0.242 [0.4]
Artisans 0.101 [0.3] 0.109 [0.3]
Non manual workers 0.140 [0.3] 0.151 [0.4]
Circumstance 4 0.174 [0.4] 0.165 [0.4]
H-grade prof. 0.075 [0.3] 0.075 [0.3]
L-grade prof. 0.115 [0.3] 0.104 [0.3]
Age of leaving education 18.116 [3.3] 17.903 [3.6]
(cob− 1953)2 1.667 [1.7] 4.559 [3.3]
(cob− 1953)3 3.002 [3.6] -11.658 [10.9]
(cob− 1953)4 5.672 [7.3] 31.634 [34.5]
Target group for simulation 0.268 [0.4]
Stay in school beyond mandatory age (D = 1) 0.540 [0.5] 0.432 [0.5]
∆ treatment 0.108*** (.006)
Proportion in trimmed sample 0.672 [0.5] 0.676 [0.5]
Of which stay beyond mandatory age (D = 1) 0.804 [0.5] 0.638 [0.5]
Of which exit at mandatory age (D = 0) 0.196 [0.5] 0.362 [0.5]
Source: Labor Force Survey 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.
Notes: Sample reduced to French male earners where circumstances have been recorded, cohorts 1950 to
1955. Standard deviations in brackets. Differences in covariates between before and after the reform are not
significant at 5%. Variable cob identifies the cohort of birth. The group of longer staying is given by those
spending some year in the secondary school beyond mandatory schooling age (14 years old for pre-reform
cohorts and 16 years old for post-reform cohorts). Trimmed sample size refers to the sub-sample of those
who attended some secondary education but without completing it. The target group, used to simulate
policy intervention, refers to students born before the reform, dropped out the educational system just at
(or before) the mandatory schooling age pre-reform (14 years old). *** indicates significance at 1%
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staying in secondary education beyond mandatory schooling age, without completing it. In
our full sample, when excluding those completing secondary education or attaining some
tertiary education, about 50% of the individuals spend at least some years in secondary
education (i.e. receive the treatment, D = 1). The impact of the Berthoin reform on
education emerges clearly from the table. For pre-reform cohorts (Z = 0), the proportion
of individuals spending at least some time in secondary education was 43.2%, significantly
rising by 10.8% in the post-reform cohorts.
In order to isolate the causal effects of attending some additional years in higher
education, we focus on the group of respondents who did not complete secondary education.
This group constitute what we call the trimmed sample, as responded are selected on the
level of years of education they report. The effect identified on this sample is a lower bound
estimate of the implications of the Berthoin’s reform, net of spill-over effects of the reform
on own education, insofar some people treated with the reform my have pursued their
studies beyond secondary education, while they would have not done so without the reform
(by lowering costs of human capital accumulation but rising opportunity costs of foregoing
higher wages). Nonetheless, the effects is appropriate for our simulation study, insofar it
can be used to simulate earnings of the units who would have dropped out early from the
system in the absence of the reform. Over a using sample of 26,421 units, the trimmed
sample we employ in estimation of the relevant effects consists of all individuals who have at
most attended some secondary education but do not hold a secondary education diploma,
and amounts to 17,779 observations, that is about 67% of the original sample in pre- and
post-reform cohorts. Within this sample, the Berthoin reform rises attendance to some
secondary education (i.e. the share of D = 1 group in the trimmed sample) from 63.8%
to 80%. We can thus define a control group in the trimmed sub-sample, corresponding to
those for which the treatment is D = 0. Estimates of the difference in earnings between the
groups D = 1 and D = 0 within the trimmed sub-sample are not causal. Our identification
strategy retains instead that differences in earnings across treatment and control that are
related to the implementation of the Loi Berthoin identify the causal effect of interest.
Table 2 illustrates the composition of the sample across the different subgroups identified
by D and Z, and it depicts the distribution of incomes by quantile relative to each of the
group. We use a conditional model to estimate such effects.
To simulate the effect of the reform, we focus on a target group of individuals that we
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: earnings by reform exposure (Z) and treatment (D)
Earnings Overall After reform (Z=1) Before reform (Z=0)
(Monthly) D=1 D=0 D=1 D=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Q5% 426.9 387.2 416.0 450.0 472.6
Q10% 762.2 762.2 686.0 800.4 731.8
Q25% 985.6 990.9 911.1 1,067.1 914.7
Q50% 1,219.6 1,250.0 1,092.8 1,311.1 1,112.9
Q75% 1,550.0 1,585.0 1,402.5 1,676.9 1,402.5
Q90% 2,058.1 2,000.0 2,200.0 2,134.3 1,900.0
Q95% 2,500.0 2,400.0 3,000.0 2,500.0 2,591.6
Mean 1,395.0 1,383.9 1,436.6 1,458.5 1,285.4
[2,160.3] [1,977.2] [3,771.0] [2,185.2] [886.9]
Trimmed sample size 17,779 7,357 1,785 5,513 3,124
Source: Labor Force Survey 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.
Notes: Trimmed sample reduced to French male earners where circumstances have been recorded, cohorts
1950 to 1955. Trimmed sample size refers to the sub-sample of those who attended some secondary education
but without completing it. Income quantiles are measured in Euro. Standard deviations reported between
brackets.
treat with additional years of education. The target group corresponds to those individuals
born before the reform (Z = 0), that exit formal education system at or before their 14th
year of life, i.e. the pre-reform mandatory school age (hence D = 0). As of Table 1,
the target group is 26.8% of the population in the pre-reform cohorts. In the simulation
exercise, we assume that this group is treated by the Berthoin reform and we simulate the
resulting increase their earnings, based on estimates of the effect of the reform. Individuals
outside the target group are not treated in the simulation. We then combine the target and
non-target groups to recover the simulated changes in the overall earnings distribution,
based on the whole sample of 26,421 individuals, that would result from this selective
treatment and assess how it would change the extent of inequality of opportunity.
3.2 Identification and estimation
Distributional effects of additional years of secondary education on earnings can be assessed
using quantile regression methods applied to the trimmed sample. Let y(p) be the quantile
of the earnings distribution, we assume linearity of the treatment effect on the earnings
14
distribution, implying:
y(p) = y(c,D,X, ε) =
∑
c
αc(p) + β(p)D +Xγ(p) + ε, (2)
where D measures educational attainment and is an indicator variable equal to 0 for indi-
viduals leaving school at the (pre-reform) compulsory age and is equal to 1 for individuals
attending some post-compulsory secondary education without graduating. The quantile
treatment effect (QTE) of interest, β(p), and the marginal effects of the observables, γ(p),
are calculated at percentile p. In our specification, we use birth cohort and year fixed
effects and cohort trends as controls. We assume that circumstances of origin have an in-
tercept effect on the earnings quantile function, while treatment effects do not vary across
circumstance types. If the treatment were assigned randomly conditional on observables
(implying ε ⊥ (D,X)) then QTE could be estimated by comparing quantiles of the condi-
tional earnings distributions by treatment status: βc(p) = Qy|D=1,X,c(p)−Qy|D=0,X,c(p).
Unobservable ability affects both the decision to accumulate further education, as well
as the earnings distribution, making the QTE estimator biased due to endogenity of the
treatment D. Instrumental variables (IV) methods provide powerful tools for identifying
causal estimates of QTE under endogeneity. We consider the Berthoin reform indicator
Z as an instrument, which affects the potential treatment status of an observation. Our
identifying assumptions are that of linearity and the fact that given X (the observable
covariates), potential outcomes and potential treatment status (i.e. the counterfactual
incomes and education level one unit would achieve if Z = 1 or if Z = 0) are jointly
independent of the Berthoin reform assignment. The credibility of the assumption rests
on the fact that we compare individuals born in very close cohorts who differ only from
assignment to the Berthoin reform. In this situation, variations in the IV identify the
causal effect of the treatment status on the outcome quantiles, while potential outcomes
should not be directly affected by the IV. Abadie et al. (2002) showed that this assumption
implies that in the population of compliers (those whose potential treatment assignment
status changes by effect of changes in the IV), comparisons by D conditional on X have a
causal interpretation.
Using the quantile regression procedure outlined in Abadie et al. (2002) we identify
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the QTE β(p) on the groups of compliers:
QY |X,D1>D0,c(p) =
∑
c
αc(p) + β(p)D + Xγ(p). (3)
We estimate the linear model (2) on the trimmed sample at a finite number of points
corresponding to the vingtiles of the earnings distribution in the trimmed sample. Our
preferred specification reports treatment effects calculated on the entire trimmed sample,
while we also report estimates conditional on the circumstance group as a robustness check.
We then select significant estimated quantiles, ˆQTE(p), to treat the baseline distribution
of earnings of the target group (denote it τ = 1) in the using sample, after purging earn-
ings from year, cohort fixed effects and trends. Let the detrended distribution of earnings
opportunities be Fˆpi=0(y|c, τ = 1) = FˆD=0(y|c, τ = 1), the simulated counterfactual distri-
butions are obtained by setting Fˆ−1pi=1(p|c, τ = 1) = Fˆ−1D=0(p|c, τ = 1) + β(p) for any p.
The underlying assumption is that all units in the target group would receive the QTE
identified for the group of compliers. Effects are then rescaled to the overall population to
determine the counterfactual distribution of earnings for the treatment group. This leads
to distributions Fˆpi=0(y|c) and Fˆpi=1(y|c).
Equalization of opportunity tests are performed on these distributions. Following AHL,
the EZOP test involves estimating vectors of gap curves coordinates based on empirical
distributions at a fixed number of quantiles (%5 - 95%). Null hypothesis setting equality
or inequality constraints on these vectors allow to estimate equality or dominance in gap
curves. To assess equalization, we first assess inverse stochastic equality and dominance
null hypothesis across distributions for any degree k = 1 up to 5, and determine the implicit
ranking of circumstances. Denote κ(c, c′, pi) the minimum degree of dominance at which
two distributions Fˆpi(y|c) and Fˆpi(y|c′) can be ranked. The gap dominance test can be
performed over the class κ(c, c′, pi = 1). We test equality and dominance in gap curves
Γ(Λ
κ(c,c′,1)
0 ,Λ
′κ(c,c′,1)
0 , p) and Γ(Λ
κ(c,c′,1)
1 ,Λ
′κ(c,c′,1)
1 , p) for any p ∈ {5%, 10%, . . . , 95%}, and
report the outcome of such test. If the ranking of earnings distributions conditional on
circumstances is stable in control and simulation settings, then differences in gap curves
defined on the basis of such ranking provide a necessary and sufficient empirical condition
to conclude on robust opportunity equalization.
Opportunity amelioration refers instead to the direct comparison of earnings distribu-
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tions across policy regimes. Amelioration is verified when, for every circumstance group,
the corresponding simulated distributions of earnings dominate at a certain ISD order the
observed distributions.
Inverse stochastic dominance at order k = 1, 2 is estimated as in Beach and Davidson
(1983), while for k ≥ 3 tests are constructed by following Andreoli (2018). Asymptotic
test statistics for gap curve dominance tests and opportunity amelioration tests are based
on bootstrapping methods as in AHL.
4 Results
Table 2 shows the earnings quantiles of treated and non treated observed individuals within
the trimmed sample born before and after the implementation of the Berthoin reform. The
differences between columns (2) versus (3) and (4) versus (5) are sizeable. However, these
differences are remarkably similar across reform assignment, indicating that QTE of the
policy are low in size. Table 3 reports QTE estimates of β(p) from model (2) and their
standard error at selected quantiles for the overall population within the trimmed sample
(model (1)), as well as for the sub-samples defined by background circumstances (models
(2)-(5)). Results suggest that gains associated with the Berthoin’s reform are concentrated
in the middle of the earning distribution, as it is not possible to identify a significant effect
of the educational indicator for population percentiles that range out of the 30% to the 75%
quantiles intervals. However, this effect could be interpreted as a lower bound estimate
of the reform’s effect. By focusing only on individuals within the trimmed sample, i.e.
those who attended some secondary education without finishing it, we are sure to rule out
possible snowball or spillover effects of the reform associated with the choice of tertiary
education and to focus on the effects of accumulating only few years of education after
mandatory schooling age. Furthermore, looking at the conditional earning distribution,
the QTE estimates remain significant exclusively for the groups Circumstance 2 (farmer
or manual worker father) and Circumstance 3 (artisan or non-manual worker father).
The full impact of the access to secondary education on the earning distribution is
illustrated in Figure 1(a). Overall, the reform has a positive, but relatively modest, effect
on the entire earning distribution, which tends to increase as we move up the earning
distribution. Effects on yearly earnings are of about 150 Euro, that is about 1.4% of
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Table 3: Quantile treatment effects - Trimmed sample, IV estimator
Independent variable: Overall Conditional
Earnings Circ. 1 Circ. 2 Circ. 3 Circ. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment Q5% 49.5 -0.8 48.7 24.7 53.7
(76.9) (248.9) (86.5) (133.6) (254.3)
Treatment Q10% 57.5 -47.2 53.4 76.2 1.5
(61.7) (245.3) (63.4) (139.0) (243.1)
Treatment Q25% 90.6 -93.8 76.2 104.2 135.1
(59.1) (674.5) (59.0) (147.8) (437.1)
Treatment Q50% 142.3** 45.7 126.4** 157.2 7.7
(58.8) (720.8) (62.4) (162.9) (333.0)
Treatment Q75% 167.7* -187.3 179.9 155.8* -152.4
(88.3) (697.5) (100.3) (188.1) (542.8)
Treatment Q90% 167.7 -759.6 228.7 228.7 -457.3
(165.5) (1,978.8) (174.3) (321.4) (1,035.8)
Treatment Q95% 157.4 -1,021.4 167.7 213.4 -643.8
(306.9) (1,409.6) (278.5) (640.9) (1,145.9)
Controls (reported at Q50%)
(cob− 1953)2 11.0 -48.0 4.8 29.4 -18.0
(29.7) (319.3) (30.2) (81.2) (243.0)
(cob− 1953)4 -0.8 2.2 -0.4 -2.7 0.2
(2.8) (29.2) (2.8) (8.1) (25.3)
Circumstance 1 -0.0
(179.0)
Circumstance 3 52.6
(45.0)
Circumstance 4 116.9
(144.4)
Survey year (FE) yes yes yes yes yes
Trimmed sample size 17,779 981 11,351 3,720 1,727
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (one-tailed).
Source: Labor Force Survey 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.
Notes: Trimmed sample reduced to French male earners where circumstances have been recorded, cohorts
1950 to 1955. Trimmed sample size refers to the sub-sample of those who attended some secondary education
but without completing it. The dependent variable measures earnings in 1999, once year effect has been
eliminated. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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(a) QTE, by 5% quantiles (b) cdfs before/after treatment
Figure 1: QTE of the impact of access to secondary education on earnings.
Notes: Estimates based on the trimmed sample of cohorts 1950 to 1955 of French male earners. In panel
(a), QTEs are computed at 5% income intervals (IV estimator), the CI at 90% is computed with robust
standard errors. Controls: cohort trends, year of survey, a quartic polynomial of the gap between year
1953 and last year spent in school, and circumstance dummies. Empirical cdfs in panel (b) are obtained
for detrended earnings data (actual) an by providing policy treatment by quantile of earnings for the target
students (simulated).
median income of the pre-reform comparison group (1,112.9 Euro).
The estimated marginal effects in Figure 1(a) are used to simulate the implications
of a policy change on the earnings of the target group, using the position occupied in
that group to assign the corresponding QTE to the individual income observation to all
people on the same 5% percentile range. The target group includes students in the age
interval 11 to 14 years old who exit the formal education system in the pre-reform cohorts
exactly at age 14. This group consists of 26.8% of the 26,421 individual observations of the
using sample. Figure 2(a) illustrates the density of the target group, as well as the density
of other educational groups, across population income quantiles. Most of the individuals
targeted by the simulation are concentrated at the bottom of the distributions and receive
a zero treatment effect from an educational expansion. The share of target group decreases
substantially over the distribution of earnings quantiles.
QTE estimates are rescaled according to the target group composition at each quantile
of the main sample to simulate the overall effect of a policy change. Figure 1(b) reports
the actual distribution of earnings from pre-reform control group (pi = 0) from the using
sample and the simulated distribution of earnings (pi = 1). Overall, there is evidence
that the simulated effects induce an improvement in the distribution of earnings, which is
concentrated mostly around the median earnings level. The distribution of the simulated
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(a) By educational achievement (b) By circumstances
Figure 2: Composition of the population occupying each of the 5% tranches of earnings
quantiles, where groups are defined by educational achievement (a) and circumstances (b).
Notes: Scores have been calculated from a multinomial logit model assigning to each 5% share of population,
arranged by increasing income, the probability of belonging to each of the groups (these probabilities add
up to 1 for every 5% revenue tranche).
effects may vary across circumstance groups for two reasons: first, because circumstances
groups are unevenly distributed across deciles of the pre-reform distribution, as clarified
by Figure 2(b); second, because the target group is not equally represented across all
circumstances groups.
Table 4 reports selected quantiles of the earnings distributions in pi = 0 and simulated
earnings pi = 1 distributions in the using sample, in the target group and then breaking
down observations by parental background. Differences in average earnings across actual
and counterfactual distributions are very narrow, reflecting the small and selected effect of
the treatment of interest. Nonetheless, the simulated distributions display lower inequality
(as measured by the Gini index) than the actual distribution, highlighting that most of
the simulated effects of exogenously rising secondary school attainment has a redistributive
potential.
We use these data, the observed/actual data and the simulated counterpart, to draw
the relevant distributions under analysis. Empirical earnings cdf in the actual setting are
estimated from the using sample data to obtain conditional distribution under pi = 0 and
from the simulated sample to obtain conditional distributions pi = 1. These distributions
are reported in Figure 3. We use the implied conditional quantile functions to draw gap
curves and differences in gap curves. We use the underlying samples to bootstrap quantile
functions 200 times and obtain variance-covariance matrices for these quantiles. We make
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Table 4: Earnings distributions by cohorts for selected quantiles, actual (before policy
implementation) versus simulated data.
Quantiles Overall Target Circ. 1 Circ. 2 Circ. 3 Circ. 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Actual data (before policy implementation)
Q5% 499.1 618.2 394.0 474.8 606.3 569.1
Q10% 944.6 883.6 883.6 914.7 975.1 1,066.5
Q25% 1,226.7 1,097.0 1,269.4 1,173.3 1,275.2 1,448.3
Q50% 1,534.3 1,305.6 1,638.4 1,427.6 1,620.6 1,934.4
Q75% 2,011.7 1,529.1 2,164.2 1,808.7 2,134.3 2,748.7
Q90% 2,825.0 1,840.1 3,049.0 2,316.6 2,935.4 3,876.1
Q95% 3,535.4 2,147.0 3,841.1 2,779.7 3,665.4 4,976.7
Mean 1,825.7 1,378.5 1,940.3 1,597.6 1,875.4 2,431.4
[3,026.9] [2,102.1] [3,868.8] [2,378.3] [2,270.0] [4,785.9]
Gini 0.303 0.204 0.330 0.256 0.287 0.352
(0.006) (0.015) (0.022) (0.008) (0.010) (0.018)
Sample size 26,421 5,585 1,682 14,134 6,103 4,502
Simulated policy implementation
Q5% 499.1 618.2 394.0 474.8 606.3 569.1
Q10% 944.6 883.6 883.6 914.7 975.1 1,066.5
Q25% 1,264.3 1,097.0 1,290.2 1,219.6 1,310.5 1,473.3
Q50% 1,574.9 1,447.9 1,656.3 1,493.4 1,656.3 1,934.4
Q75% 2,011.7 1,676.1 2,164.2 1,808.7 2,134.3 2,748.7
Q90% 2,825.0 1,840.1 3,049.0 2,316.6 2,935.4 3,876.1
Q95% 3,535.4 2,147.0 3,841.1 2,779.7 3,665.4 4,976.7
Mean 1,842.5 1,458.3 1,950.0 1,621.0 1,888.0 2,436.3
[3,024.7] [2,102.7] [3,867.5] [2,376.5] [2,267.6] [4,784.9]
Gini 0.299 0.197 0.326 0.251 0.284 0.351
(0.006) (0.014) (0.022) (0.008) (0.010) (0.018)
Sample size 26,421 5,585 1,682 14,134 6,103 4,502
Source: Estimates from Labor Force Survey 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.
Notes: Earnings quantiles for earnings distribution detrended by the age effect. Sample size refers to
the overall sample of French male earners where circumstances have been recorded, cohorts 1950 to 1955.
Earnings after policy implementation are obtained by assigning quantile treatment effects estimated by
model (1) in Table 3 to the target group. Standard deviations reported in brackets. Gini index are reported
for each subgroup’s earnings distribution. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated by bootstrapping
100 replications of the Gini index.
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(a) Actual data (pi = 0) (b) Simulated data (pi = 1)
Figure 3: Earning distribution before and after simulating the expansion of the secondary
education system.
use of these curves estimates as well as the associated covariance matrices to run join tests
of opportunity equalization, following Andreoli and Fusco (2019).
Figure 4 presents the differences (in gap curves) for each pair of circumstances. These
differences are obtained by differentiating for each pair of circumstances the differences in
earnings (D, the gap curves), in the Generalized Lorenz (GL) curves (D2, the integrals of
the gap curves) and in the integrals of the GL (D3, the double integrals of the gap curves),
computed at each percentile of the actual (for pi = 0) and simulated (for pi = 1) earning
distribution.
Figures 5 (for pi = 0) and 6 (for pi = 1) in the Appendix provide a graphical account
of the extent of disadvantage in the actual and simulated data respectively. The patterns
of the differences in the GL curves ordinates and their integrals are positive along the
earning percentiles domain for all pairs of circumstance in both social states, except for the
comparison between Circumstance 1 and Circumstances 2. For this pair of circumstances,
indeed, the policy implementation reverts the direction of the advantage as measured by
the differences in the GL curves ordinates and their integrals. Therefore it is possible to
rank these circumstances only according to ISD at order κ = 3. Graphical evidence is
that almost all pairs of circumstances are clearly ranked by the extent of advantage they
display under both policy regimes, and the ranking of advantage is stable across policy
regimes, except for comparisons involving the least advantaged group. The differences
of these curves, which serve at identifying the gap dominance, are little conclusive as the
curves fluctuate around the zero line (Figure 4), thus providing inconclusive evidence about
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(a) Circumstance 2 - Circumstance 1 (b) Circumstance 3 - Circumstance 1
(c) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 1 (d) Circumstance 3 - Circumstance 2
(e) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 2 (f) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 3
Figure 4: Difference in differences in quantile functions (D), GL curves (D2) and integrals
of the GL curves (D3) computed at each percentile of the actual and simulated earnings
distributions.
Notes: Values on the horizontal axis refer to percentiles of the earnings distribution. Values on the vertical
axes express the difference across policies in the differences between earning gaps, GL curves gaps and
gaps in the integrals of GL curves associated to pairs of circumstances, in Euros. Earnings differences in
differences trimmed at 250 and −250 Euro.
opportunity equalization across all circumstance pairs. We now use joint tests to determine
the extent to which some of these intersections in gap curves can be ruled out in favour
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of a weak form of gap curves dominance. The outcome of these joint tests is presented in
Table 5.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 we report, for each policy and for each pair of circum-
stances, the direction of dominance and the minimal order at which ISD cannot be rejected
by the data at a 5% confidence level. For instance, one has to read the first dominance
relation in (1) as Circ.1 ISD1 Circ.2 (but not the inverse) under pi = 0. The joint tests
for EZOP confirm that the direction of the advantage as measured by ISD is unaffected by
policy implementation for all pairs of circumstances, except for Circumstances 1 and Cir-
cumstances 2. Furthermore, the comparison between Circumstance 1 and Circumstance 3
cannot be ranked according to ISD1. For these two circumstances, indeed, it is necessary
to test dominance up to the order three, which is verified both before and after policy
intervention. It is nevertheless possible to rank unambiguously the Circumstances 2, 3 and
4 (French father, different socio-economic classes) according to ISD1 both before and after
policy simulation. This result shows that the policy has no impact in reducing agreement
over the direction of the disadvantage, nor on changing the direction of disadvantage itself.
Results for the distance comparison and for the gap curve dominance tests are reported
respectively in column (3) and (4) of Table 5.5 Gap curve dominance relations are tested
at 5% significance level. The tested model, reported in brackets, gives the order of differ-
entiation of circumstances’ earnings distributions under each policy regime, which allows
to conclude in favor of dominance in gap curves. For instance, the model associated to
circumstances Circumstance 2 and Circumstance 1 is (12− 21), which means that to find
dominance in Gap curves at order three it is necessary to take the difference of the integral
of GL of Circumstance 1 minus the integral of GL of Circumstance 2 under policy pi = 0
and the inverse under policy pi = 1. Otherwise, alternative models for gap dominance al-
ways reject the null hypothesis of equality or dominance even at orders of inverse stochastic
dominance. This specific ranking is consistent with the fact that gap curves in panel a)
of Figure 4 always lie below the horizontal line. Altogether, there is agreement on the
order of ranking in each social state, and there is agreement on the fact that the ranking
switches across social states, implying that dominance in gap curves identifies agreement
on the reduction of unfair disadvantage.
5For a given model, we report the minimal order at which it is not possible to reject, with a confidence
of 5%, that the gap curve generated by that model is either statistically equal to zero, or it always lie above
the zero line for all the considered quantiles.
25
For the other pairs of circumstances, we find evidence that the gap curve dominance at
the first order cannot be rejected at the 5% confidence level for the pairs {3, 2} and {4, 2}.
The gap curve dominance tests are coherent with the direction of advantage measured by
ISD under both policy regimes, although for many comparisons the change in distance is
statistically zero (that is, the gap curve coincides with the zero line). This result is coherent
with the fact that the simulated policy has no sizeable impact on the earnings distribution
of Circumstances 1 and 3. The distance between Circumstance 2 and the Circumstances 3
and 4 is reduced by effect of policy simulation, while the distance between Circumstances
1 and 4 remains unaffected. This result is consistent with the fact that an expansion of the
secondary education system provides benefits for students coming from more disadvantaged
backgrounds. The policy does not have a statistical impact on the distribution associated
to Circumstance 1.
We conclude that under the assumption of the rank dependent model for preferences,
the ex ante EZOP criterion is validated by the data, although there is only weak evidence
of consensus that the simulated increased in education attainment reduces unfair earnings
gaps in France. To quantify the opportunity equalizing effect of the reform Berthoin we
compute the Gini opportunity index (GO(pi)) of Lefranc et al. (2008), using the information
reported in Table 4 about the average earnings, the Gini index and the relative sample
size of the overall population and each circumstance/background groups. The GO index
provides a cardinal evaluation of the extent of IOP within each policy regime.6 We find
that after the policy implementation the unfair inequality reduces from GO(0) = 0.0385 to
GO(1) = 0.0360, i.e. a reduction of about 6.5%, comparable in magnitude to the estimates
by AHL in the evaluation study of the Norwegian Kindergarten Act. We conclude that
a policy aimed at granting to drop out students the possibility to spend at least some
additional years in the secondary education system equalizes opportunities in the sense of
ex ante EZOP, this effect being strong only for comparisons involving Circumstance 2, 3
and 4.
Differently from what has been found by AHL, our results reject potential trade-offs
between opportunity equalization and amelioration. The opportunity amelioration tests
we report in Table 5 conclude that none of the groups has lost, in terms of earnings, by
6Let µ and G denote respectively the average earning and the Gini index, while s indicates the population
share represented by one of the k specific circumstances groups, which are indexed by i or j, then the GO
index is defined as GO(y) = 1
µ
k∑
i=1
∑
j>1
sisj(µj(1−Gj)− µi(1−Gi)).
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effect of the educational expansion, while some groups, notably the sons of French farmers
and manual workers and the executives and professionals, have gained from the reform.
Equalization follows from the fact that more disadvantaged groups are catching up, by
effect of a change in education, with the earnings of the privileged groups, this effect being
robust across the distribution of effort.
5 Conclusions
In this article we provide an illustrative application of the criterion proposed by Andreoli
et al. (2019) to assess the degree of equalization of opportunity achieved by alternative
public policies.
We evaluate if an educational policy, widening the access to the secondary education
system, fosters equalization of opportunity. Obtained results suggest that this policy has
a very mild impact on future students’ earnings. The gains associated with this policy
mostly affect those in the centre of the distribution, while leaving unchanged the tails of the
earnings distribution. However, we find that this allocation of gains promotes opportunity
equalization in the sense of the EZOP criterion. The expansion of the secondary education
seems to provide benefits for students coming from more disadvantaged backgrounds, with
the circumstance groups 2 and 3 experiencing a narrow gap with respect of circumstance
4 by effect of the policy. At the same time the policy seems to have any statistical impact
on the distribution of the group of individuals with non French father.
We speculate that the increase in accessibility to the educational system is more effec-
tive in equalizing opportunities if the adequate reforms take place early in the students ca-
reers. For instance, AHL find strong opportunity equalization potential of kindergarten ex-
pansion, albeit the policy has insignificant average returns. International evidence suggest
that school education reforms comparable to the Loi Berthoin have high average returns.
We provide evidence of only mild equalization effects. This result suggests that equalization
of opportunity objectives do not contrast efficiency motivations in public provision of edu-
cational services. There is growing evidence (Cunha, Heckman and Lochner 2006, Cunha
and Heckman 2007) that it is cheaper and more efficient for the society to compensate
disadvantaged individuals/groups early in their educational career rather than to provide
late intervention measures.
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We leave to further investigations the assessment of the opportunity equalizing impact
of other types of policies that can take place earlier or later (such as expanding university
attendance) on the opportunities of the treated. Research in this field would provide
additional information on hidden benefits of such policies that are often overlooked by
traditional cost-benefit methods for policy evaluation.
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A Appendix: additional graphs
(a) Circumstance 2 - Circumstance 1 (b) Circumstance 3 - Circumstance 1
(c) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 1 (d) Circumstance 3 - Circumstance 2
(e) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 2 (f) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 3
Figure 5: Differences in quantile functions (D), GL curves (D2) and integrals of the GL
curves (D3) computed at each percentile of the actual earnings distribution without policy
treatment.
Notes: Values on the horizontal axis refer to percentiles of the actual earnings distribution. Values on the
vertical axes express the difference between curves, in Euros. The curves represent the differences between
the outcomes prospect associated to two distinct circumstances, for a total of six comparisons. Earnings
differences are trimmed at 300 and −100 Euro.
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(a) Circumstance 2 - Circumstance 1 (b) Circumstance 3 - Circumstance 1
(c) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 1 (d) Circumstance 3 - Circumstance 2
(e) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 2 (f) Circumstance 4 - Circumstance 3
Figure 6: Differences in quantile functions (D), GL curves (D2) and integrals of the GL
curves (D3) computed at each percentile of the simulated earnings distribution with policy
treatment.
Notes: Values on the horizontal axis refer to percentiles of the simulated earnings distribution. Values
on the vertical axes express the difference between curves, in Euros. The curves represent the differences
between the outcomes prospect associated to two distinct circumstances, for a total of six comparisons.
Earnings differences are trimmed at 300 and −100 Euro.
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